The aim of this study is to make research on the main streams of historical development of national ideologies and claims of the peoples from the territory of ex-Yugoslavia from the time of national revivals up to the present day. The main research strategy is analyzing historical sources from the “first-hand” category, documentary material from different national archives, ideological works and newspapers of different ethnopolitical background. It is also applied the methods of comparison of different domestic and international scientific research results on the study-topic of our investigation. The results of research show that for the Yugoslav and Balkan nations territorial and national rights were always of much greater importance than the human or civic rights. This historical fact became a milestone for development of national ideologies among the Yugoslavs, which put on pedestal of “national policy” the aim to transform ethnographic borders into the national-state borders. The period of bloody dissolution of the SFR of Yugoslavia followed by the inter-ethnopolitical conflicts in Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia (1991–2001) is typical example of such “national policy” overwhelmingly rooted in the idea of “inevitability” of ethnic cleansing, persecution, assimilation and the inter-ethnic exchange of the peoples. The study research has to be further continued by investigation of the prime historical sources, i.e. archival material, in several Balkan and international archives and libraries (for instance, in Albania and Vatican). Historical retrospective of development of the national ideologies and territorial claims is necessary for the reason to understand practical politics of the Yugoslavs after the end of the Cold War when the Balkans once again became the “powder-keg” of Europe in order to predict a future development of the local nationalism and regional political affairs for the matter of both regional and Europe’s security. The case-study is based on 20 years of multi-sided comprehensive research and non-partisan scientific investigation.

**Key word:** Nationalism, security, Yugoslavs, Balkans, ethnopolitical conflicts.

**INTRODUCTION**

“Ethnic affiliation has never been forgotten in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. It did play a certain role, and it did influence decisions even during the Tito’s era of strict ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ (Várady, 1997).”

People, nation and state: I agree that “in Yugoslavia all political problems are intimately linked with the issue of nationalism (Holmes, 1986)”. Indeed, the fixing of inner or administrative borders between Yugoslavia’s nations and nationalities became one of the main issues that forged nationalism after the Second World War onward and most probably in the future as well. The problem was in fact that internal borders between socialist republics and two autonomous provinces of the ex-Yugoslav federation (from 1974 to 1991 Yugoslavia was de facto confederation of eight independent political entities) were set up in 1945 and definitely delimited ten years later, but they very often did not follow historical, natural, ethnic and justice principle. The core of the puzzle became that constitutionally six federal republics and two autonomous provinces were seen as the “national” states, i.e., with the dominance of a nation or nationality, but the inner administrative borders failed in many cases to strictly separate ethnic communities. To be honest, it was impossible without exchanging of the parts of national groups between republics and provinces what finally was done during the civil war of 1991–1995 and later the Kosovo War of 1998–1999 within the framework of the ethnic cleansing, i.e. the forced exchange of the population to the “proper” side of the borders (Adams et al., 2001).

The first problem to be solved in this study is to define the terms of a “people”, a “nation” and a “state”. In search of definitions of terms „people”, „nation” and „state” it should be pointed that a “modern” state is composed by three elements: the territory, the people and the power, while older patriarchal theory of a state is based on four elements: the family, the tribe, the people and the nation. A definition by the objective criteria of a “people” or/and a “state” in the ethnic sense takes into consideration the language, religion, history, culture and fate: persons speaking the same language, adhering to the same religion, or with the same history, culture or fate are a people (for instance, the Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Albanians and Greeks). Individuals with the same characteristics form a people or a nation (German “Kulturnation”). However, according to the theory of ethnic indifference, all persons who hold the citizenship of a state, regardless of their ethnic or national origin, confessional affiliations, etc., form the people of the state (for instance, the Bosnians, Americans, Swiss people and Canadians) (Rex, 2010).

A definition through subjective criteria (favored, for instance, by Ernest Renan) points that “a people is made up of all persons who want to live together (Várady, 1997)”.
according to the theory of ethnic indifference, for example, all citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be one people, i.e. one nation (Bosnians), but according to subjective criteria, they can be Serbs, Croats or Muslims/Bosniaks. However, if we would implement in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the understanding of a nation in the sense of German 19th century Romanticist ideology (favored by Herder, Humboldt, Fichte) that only language determines a people/nation we have to recognize in this case only one "ethnolinguistic" group in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Shtokavians, i.e. the Serbs (Sotirović, 2005). That only language determines a people/nation we have to recognize in this case only one "ethnolinguistic" group in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Shtokavians, i.e. the Serbs. The same case is with the so-called "Montenegrins" who are in fact the Serbs by their "ethnicity" (Kostić, 2000).

The crucial question on this place is: when does a people (Greek ethnos, French ethnie) become a nation? The answer according to the nationality principle is: a nation is a people in possession of, or striving for, its own state (Pieterse, 1998). The relationship between a state and a nation is vital in the case of Yugoslav nationalism(s). At the times of Reformation, Counter-Reformation and Baroque the nationalism on the Yugoslav lands was shaped in accordance to the famous model of the Augsburg Religious Peace Settlement of 1555: "Cuius regio, eius religio". However, already from the epoch of Enlightenment followed by the age of Romanticism the nationalism among the Yugoslavs, especially among the Serbs and Croats, was modeled according to the new formula: "Cuius regio, eius lingua". Finally, the South Slavs advocated a separation of state and ethnicity (mainly understood as ethnolinguistic people) from the mid-19th century (Conversi, 2004).

The most distinguished feature of majority of the Yugoslav and Balkan nationalisms is that they accepted the formula: "One language—one people—one nation—one state" (Blonnaert and Verschuere, 1998). In the process of (national)-state building the Yugoslav nationalities followed exactly the axiom created by David Miller: "Political communities should as far as possible be organized in such a way that their members share a common national identity, which binds them together in the face of their many diverse private and group identities". Like Miller's axiom, the saying of Ernest Gellner that nationalism is political principle according to which political unity (i.e. state) should be overlapped with national unity (i.e. nation) is quite valid for the majority of examples of the Yugoslav and Balkan nationalisms, especially for those from the 20th century – a century of ethnic cleansing, forced migrations and assimilation in the Balkans (and other parts of Europe and the world).

Another significant peculiarity of Yugoslav nationalisms is that some of them (for instance, Croatian in the 19th century and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim/Bosniak in the 20th century) accepted (with local modifications) the French model of ethnic indifference in state formation and nation-building. According to this state-nation model, there are three main pillars of the state-nation building: Popular sovereignty: "people" = legal fiction to constitute normative principles: (individual) equality and democratic state organization; National sovereignty: "nation" = legal fiction to defend external independence and to discriminate internal pluralism, also in terms of ethnic difference; effects: repression of pluralism through assimilation (Marko, 2007). In other words, all inhabitants of Croatia have to be the "Croats" and all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina have to be the "Bosnians". I argue that ultimate goal of acceptance of such a model among the Yugoslavs was not to build up a kind of "civic society", but rather to assimilate the "other" ethnonational groups for the purpose of creation of a nationally homogeneous state (Dogo and Bianchi, 1998).

On the other hand, instead of the French state-nation model, some of the Yugoslav nationalisms (for instance, Serbian, Albanian, Slovenian and contemporary Croatian and Macedonian) in regard to the state creation and nation-building had (has) a feature of the Central and East European nation-state model, which had (has) the next main characteristics (Riall, 1994).

Nationality principle: "nation" = one people + one state; Political function: unification for state-formation; The "individual" is no longer the ethnically indifferent "citoyen", but defined by membership in a certain ethnic community; "Equality" relates only to members of own group; "Difference" of groups is translated into majority/minority position; Possible effects: ethnic cleansing through expulsion from territory, extinction.

In other words, the "nation-owner" of a state has more rights then the "nations-non-owners". The "nations-non-owners" are in fact proclaimed, or treated, as the ethnic (national) minorities. However, it is a common Yugoslav and Balkan understanding of minorities that they are in fact a great source of "irredenta", i.e. of secession (Ypi, 2007).

Therefore, if one Yugoslav or Balkan country can not avoid to have a minority group then the slogan "why should we be a minority in your country when you can be a minority in our" should be respected.

What concerns the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yugoslavia) it existed the so-called "three-level system" of a national (group) rights. On the first level there were six "Nations of Yugoslavia" (the Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs and Slovenes). Each of them had their own "national" state that was one of six socialist republics in Yugoslavia. On the second level there were ten "Nationalities of Yugoslavia" (the Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Gypsies, Italians, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Turks). Finally, on the lowest, third, level there were "Other Nationalities and Ethnic Groups" (the Austrians, Greeks, Jews, Germans, Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, Vlachs, "Yugoslavs", etc.) (Pavlovitch, 1999).

However, it has to be stressed here, that there were only three recognized constitutive nations within the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes from 1918 to 1929 and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929 to 1941: the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Nevertheless, in post-war socialist Yugoslavia there were recognized six of them: the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims. Actually, the last three of them have been newly proclaimed nations at the expense of the Serb national corpus.

In sum, there are two types of national identification: Based on “civic” criteria of grouping (France, Croatia in the 19th century, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, the U.S.A., etc.); Based on “ethnic” criteria of classifying as common bloodship and culture (the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Slovenes, Albanians, etc.) (Smith, 1993).

In conclusion, referring to the Yugoslav case, I agree with Anthony Smith: “By ‘nationalism’ I shall mean an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.” ... “A ‘nation’ in turn I shall define as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members” (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007).

Nationalism, ideology and formation of the national states: There are many talks about nationalism among the peoples from the former Yugoslavia during the last two decades and a half what is quite understandable taking into consideration the post-Communist time atrocities, as a continuation of the Second World War crimes based on certain political ideologies, committed on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia (Sotirotić, 2005). I want to argue that there is a direct link between contemporary nationalism(s) among the Yugoslavs and their national ideologies, which are developed in the previous decades and even centuries. What happened with the Yugoslavs from 1991 to 1999 and probably to be repeated in the 21st century once again, it cannot by explained and understood without a proper knowledge of their national histories, interethnic relations, and above all without familiarity with historical developments of the Yugoslav, South Slavic and Balkan nationalism(s) in the European context (Wilson and Donnan, 1998). Whoever wants fairly to resolve any contemporary problem in the Balkans has to have a profound knowledge of the Balkan history. If somewhere the motto Historia est magistra vitae is useful for the settlement of the current problems it is exactly the Balkans and especially ex-Yugoslavia. Therefore, it should be known that among the Balkans peoples a national history is understood as a long-standing continuation of efforts which are leading to transform the ethnolinguistic group from the status of ethnos into the status (or level) of nation. It practically means that final historical and natural “task” of every Balkan ethnic group is to live in united national state (Smith, 1986). This “national sacral task” is to be realized by any means.

Clearly, territory and common will to live together are the crucial elements in definition of nation in the case of Yugoslav and Balkan peoples (and others as well) (Dumont, 1970). There is no nation without definitely marked borders of the territory where the nation is living. The members of nation have a consciousness of the exact borders of the territorial distribution of their ethnos (Smith, 1991). Consequently, ethnographic borders should be transformed into national-state borders; i.e. state borders should follow current ethnolinguistic dispersion of people, but as well in great extent and historical borders of “national” state. No more – no less! Historical consequence, however, was (and is) that there was more blood than available land for satisfaction of every single national claim in the ex-Yugoslavia and the Balkans (Köksal, 2008).

The Yugoslav nationalism(s) is composed by seven main elements: I) territory; II) state; III) language and alphabet; IV) history and collective memory; V) religion; VI) people; and VII) tradition and custom. The essence is that according to the national(istic) perceptions, a single culturally and linguistically homogenous ethnic group (people) had been living in the past on its own ethnographic space. However, due to historical circumstances like foreign occupations, wars, famines, etc. (for example, Ottoman occupation, German conquest, Hungarian and Italian rule, permanent shortage of food in Montenegro and Herzegovina), one bigger or smaller part of national community left its own genuine (national) soil and went to diaspora settling itself on the territories of the “others” (for instance, Serbs from Kosovo-Metohija, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia proper to the Southern Hungary, Slavonia, Srem, Croatia and Dalmatia in 1690 and 1737). (Cvijić, 1922). However, in the meantime the “abandoned” national soil was resettled with “newcomers” of different ethnolinguistic background in comparison with the “genuine owners” of this soil (for instance, Albanian migrants to Kosovo’s plain from Albania’s mountains after the First Serbian Great Migration from that region in 1690). Nevertheless, according to the “historical rights”, the nation of the “genuine ownership” of the soil in question has a legitimate right to resettle itself once again to the disputed territory and, even more, to include this territory, which historically belongs to the “genuine ownership-nation”, into united national state (for instance, the territory of “Srpska Krajina” in Croatia, Kosovo, “Turkish Croatia “ in Bosnia, Western Macedonia, etc.). Furthermore, according to the “ethnic rights” of a nation, certain territories where the nation is in majority and living there for the long period of time (regardless that these territories are not belonging to the nation according to the “historic rights”) had to be included into the national united state, too. For instance, Serbs claim the territory of “Srpska Krajina” in Republic of Croatia according to Serbian “ethnic rights” (and morality because of the genocide, i.e. ethnocide that was committed on Serbs in this region by the Nazi-ustashi government of Croatia during the Second World War), but at the same time Serbian demand upon Kosovo is based on their “historic rights” in regard to this particular region. A totally complicated situation emerged...
when Croats claim the territory of “Srpska Krajina” according to Croatian “historic rights”, and Albanians are demanding Kosovo/a according to their “ethnic rights” (Sotirović, 2009). Unfortunately, the way out from such stalemate situation of overlapping of different rights of several nations over the same territories is found in forced deportations, expulsions, ethnic cleansing and genocide/ethnocide committed at that moment by politically and military stronger ethnolinguistic community over the weaker one(s) with a help by some of international Great Powers (like present-day ethnic cleansing of Serbs and other non-Albanians by local Albanians in Kosovo/a with a direct support by US, NATO and EU administrations).

The “ethnic” society is usually preferred instead of “civil” society among the Yugoslavs (Sotirović, 2005). Probably the main reason for this preference is the fact that a person is usually identifying himself with a nation, i.e. with national belonging; but a nation can be “realized” only in its own national state. I agree with the opinion that strongest and the most sincere loyalty is a loyalty towards a national state. National culture can be as well better preserved and further developed within the national state borders. Surely, one of the crucial preconditions for the freedom all over the globe (or at least in the Balkans) is a strengthening of the national states. However, there are no real national states without clearly fixed national borders.

If one would compare the size of present day independent states in the Balkans with their size from the previous centuries when they firstly became autonomous and later independent (Montenegro 1516/1878; Serbia 1829/1878; Greece 1829/1830; Bulgaria 1878/1908; Romania 1859/1878) she/he will notice that these states in the time of achieving autonomous status and independence included no more than a half of the territory ruled by them nowadays. All of them obtained their autonomy and independence by secession from declining Ottoman Empire (the “Sick Man on the Bosphorus”) and later enlarged their national territories by irredentist policy of conquering still “non-liberated” national soil. The purpose of such policy of irredentism was to overlap national-state borders with the ethnographic borders of their national ethnic dispersion. This process is not finished until today. This irredentist attitude led all Balkan countries to the serious ethnic conflicts during the last two centuries because of the mixed population on many territories (for instance, “Srpska Krajina” in Croatia, Kosovo/a, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Western Thrace, etc.) and the lack of clear national awareness in these lands (for instance, the Slavic population in the 19th century Macedonia).

According to Robert Hislope, there are four factors of ethnic conflicts, either among the Yugoslavs or elsewhere: 1) primary source of contention; 2) cleavage lines; 3) role of culture; and 4) role of elite (Hislope, 1998). The results of ethnic conflicts between the Yugoslavs are: Two hundred years of animosities and warfare; Assimilation of the minorities; Repression of the minorities; Ethnic cleansing; Promotion of historical revisionism. The national dreams of creation of united, enlarged and greater national states, however, are only partially realized by the Yugoslavs and other South-East European people in several historical occasions (as results of either struggles against the foreign rule or inter-ethnic conflicts) (Table 1).

I would like to emphasize that while the current state borders of the West European countries are very similar to those established either till 1815 or till 1885, and while the Central and East European borders are almost identical with those established from 1919 to 1924, the external borders of successor states of the ex-Yugoslavia are identical with those established by Communist Titoist government in 1945 as inner borders within the socialist Yugoslavia.

The Balkan, South Slavic and Yugoslav nationalism have deep historic roots. They could be traced back to the time of the Baroque epoch, followed by development of the national ideologies in the era of the Enlightenment and the time of Romanticism, and finally coming to us in very slightly modified version of the original ideological-political postulates. Contemporary irredentism of the Yugoslav nations, which can be also named as “piedmontism” according to the archetype of the Italian unification from 1859 to 1861/1866, is essentially based on historical development of the national ideologies of the Yugoslavs. Adopted policy of irredentism led unavoidably Yugoslav peoples to the bloody ethnic conflicts followed by ethnic persecutions and cleansing during the last Yugoslav civil war, which started in 1991 and still is not over on the ground of the FYR of Macedonia. A part of irredentist approach was a regular non-recognition of the identity of the neighboring nations.

It is necessary to mention in the next paragraphs the most representative cases of such approach - the cases which influenced minds of the Yugoslav politicians and national ideologists in the 19th and the 20th century.

Pavao Ritter Vitezović, 1652–1713, an aristocrat of German origin of the Dalmatian city of Senj, was the first South Slavic national ideologist who extended the Croatian ethnic name not only to the Balkan Slavs, but rather to all Slavs. Using several different medieval historical sources upon Slavic settlement on the Balkan Peninsula and many of South Slavic literal and historical works that recorded a popular tradition about Balkan-Illyrian origin of all Slavic peoples, Vitezović concluded that legendary Slavic progenitors, brothers Czech, Lech and Rus, should be understood as of the Croat ethnolinguistic origin. Indentifying the brothers as Croats, Vitezović concluded that in fact the entire Slavic population in the world is descended from the Croats.

During the last stage of the Great Vienna War, 1683–1699, between the Christian Alliance against the Ottomans, when the struggle between Venice and the Habsburgs for division of the South Slavic lands emerged, Vitezović wrote a memorandum to the Austrian Emperor in order to refute any Venetian claim on the territory of Croatian „historical” lands. His work about limites totius Croatiae (“the borders of whole...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Territories included into the national-state borders</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Bulgaria 1878 (“San Stefano”)</td>
<td>Rumelia (from the Balkan Range to Adrianople/Edirne including upper and middle stream of Maritza River with Philippopol/Plovdiv and Burgas on the littoral of the Black Sea), the whole portion of Vardar Macedonia (present day independent state of FYR of Macedonia including Bitola and Ohrid), part of Aegean Macedonia including Kastoria, Kavala and Seres in present day Greece to Saloniki and Chalkidiki Peninsula, south-east part of present day Albania including Koritza, parts of present day South-Eastern Serbia including Vranje, Pirot, Caribrod and Bosiligrad, Southern Dobrodgea (Dobrudschia) including Mangalia, and part of present day European Turkey to Midia on the Black Sea littoral.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Bulgaria 1885-1913</td>
<td>Bulgaria proper (from Danube River to the Balkan Range and from Timok River to the Black Sea), East Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut River) and the main part of Dobrodgea (between the lower Danube, the Danube delta and the Black Sea with Constanta).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater Bulgaria 1913-1918</td>
<td>Bulgaria proper (from Danube River to the Black Sea), East Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut River) and the whole portion of Dobrodgea (including and Southern Dobrodgea with Silistria).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater Moldavia 1856-1878 (Romania from 1859)</td>
<td>Moldavia and Southern Bessarabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater Romania 1878-1913</td>
<td>Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut River) and the main part of Dobrodgea (between the lower Danube, the Danube delta and the Black Sea with Constanta).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater Romania 1913-1916</td>
<td>Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut River) and the whole portion of Dobrodgea (including and Southern Dobrodgea with Silistria).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater Romania 1918-1940</td>
<td>Bessarabia, Bucovina, Transylvania, Eastern Banat, Crisana and Maramures. Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut River), the whole portion of Dobrodgea (including and Southern Dobrodgea with Silistria).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater Romania 1945 onward</td>
<td>Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut River), the main portion of Dobrodgea, the whole portion of Transylvania, Western Banat, Northern Bucovina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Serbia 1878-1912</td>
<td>Serbia proper (from the Danube to the lower stream of South Morava and Ibar Rivers and from Drina to Timok Rivers) and South-Eastern Serbia (with the cities of Vranje, Nish, Leskovac and Pirot and the region of Toplica), Northern part of Sanjak (with the cities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Prijevoj, Nova Varosh and Priboj).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1913-1915
Eastern Kosovo and Vardar Macedonia (present day FYR of Macedonia).

### Greater Serbia 1918
- Serbia proper (from the Danube to the lower stream of South Morava and Ibar Rivers and from Drina to Timok Rivers), South-Eastern Serbia (with the cities of Vranje, Nis, Leskovac and Pirot and the region of Toplica), Northern part of Sanjak (with the cities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Nova Varosh and Priboj), Eastern Kosovo, Vardar Macedonia (present day FYR of Macedonia), Montenegro (including Western Kosovo [the so-called Metohija] and Southern Sanjak with the cities of Bijelo Polje, Pljevlja, Rozaj and Berane), Southern Baranja, Western Banat and Bachka.

### Greater Serbia 1945-1999
Serbia proper (from the Danube to the lower stream of South Morava and Ibar Rivers and from Drina to Timok Rivers), South-Eastern Serbia (with the cities of Vranje, Nis, Leskovac and Pirot and the region of Toplica), Northern part of Sanjak (with the cities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Nova Varosh and Priboj), and only formally Kosovo-Metohija, Western Banat, Eastern Srem and Bachka.

### Greater Croatia 1939-1941
- Karlovac, Varazdin, Sisak and Petrinja, Slavonia (from Drava River to Sava River), Western Srem (including Ilok and Shid), Dalmatia, the main part of Adriatic Islands, the region of Dubrovnik, part of Southern Bosnia-Herzegovina (including the cities of Travnik, Bugojno, Fojnica, Dubno, Imotski, Stolac, Mostar, Ljubushki, Metkovic and Kupres) and part of Northern Bosnia-Herzegovina (including the cities of Brchko, Gradachac, Derventa and Bosanski Brod).

### Greater Croatia 1941-1945
- Croatia proper (from Drava River to Senj and from Sutla River to Korana River including the cities of Zagreb, Karlovac, Varazdin, Sisak and Petrinja), Slavonia (from Drava River to Sava River), the whole portion of Srem (between Danube River and Sava River), Southern Dalmatia, the region of Dubrovnik, the islands of Pag, Brach and Hvar, and the whole portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### Greater Croatia 1945 onward
Croatia proper (from Drava River to Senj and from Sutla River to Korana River including the cities of Zagreb, Karlovac, Varazdin, Sisak and Petrinja), Slavonia (from Drava River to Sava River), the western portion of Srem (between Danube River and Sava River including the city of Ilok, but excluded the city of Shid), whole Dalmatia, the region of Dubrovnik, all Adriatic Islands, the city and district of Rijeka, Southern Baranja including the city of Beli Manastir, Eastern Medjumurije including the city of Chakovec and whole portion of Istrian Peninsula.

### Greater Slovenia 1945 onwards
Slovenia proper (Carniola or Krain or Kranjska), Southern Styria or Steiermark or Shtajerska, Southern Karinthia or Kärnten or Korushka, Slovenian littoral with the cities of Koper, Portoroz, Izola and Piran, Prekmurje with the city of Murska Sobota and Western Medjumurje.

### Greater Albania 1941-1945
Albania proper (from the city of Scodra or Skutari or Skadar and the Prokletije Range to the Devoll and the upper stream of Vjosë River, and from Drim River and Ohrid Lake to the Adriatic littoral), Kosovo with Metohija including Prishtina, Pec/Paja, Gusinje and Gnjilane, but without Mitrovica, Eastern Montenegro including Ulcinj, but without Bar and North-Western Macedonia including Struga, Kichevo, Debar, Tetovo, Gostivar, but without Ohrid.

### Greater Albania 1999 onward (in the process of creation)
Albania proper (from the city of Scodra or Skutari or Skadar and the Prokletije Range to the Devoll and the upper stream of Vjosë River, and from Drim River and Ohrid Lake to the Adriatic littoral), Kosovo with Metohija including Prishtina, Pec/Paja, Gusinje, Gnjilane and Mitrovica, Western Macedonia and expectedly, Western Montenegro with the littoral from the Bojana to Bar including Ulcinj and northern part of Southern Epirus, which is today a part of Greece.

### Greater Hungary 1938-1944
Hungary proper (present day Hungary, i.e. Hungary around the Alföld Plain), Southern Slovakia, Ruthenia, Northern Transylvania, Prekmurje, Medjumurje, Southern Baranja and Bachka.

### Greater Montenegro 1878-1913
Montenegro proper or "Ancient Montenegro" (from Mt. Lovcen to Zeta River and from Pusti lisac to Sutorman including Cetinje, rijeka Crnojevica, Virpazar and Kchevo), Rudine, Vasojevici, Shavnik, Podgorica region, the littoral from Skadar Lake to Bar, Ulcinj and Bojana River, Nikshic, Durmitor, Kolashin, Sinjajevina and the land around Piva River.

### Greater Montenegro 1913-1916
Montenegro proper or "Ancient Montenegro" (from Mt. Lovcen to Zeta River and from Pusti lisac to Sutorman including Cetinje, rijeka Crnojevica, Virpazar and Kchevo), Rudine, Vasojevici, Shavnik, Podgorica region, the littoral from Skadar Lake to Bar, Ulcinj and the Bojana, Nikshic, Durmitor, Kolashin, Sinjajevina, the land around Piva River, Southern Sanjak with Pljevlja, Shahovici, Bijelo Polje, Mojkovac, Berane, Rozaje, Gusinje, Plav and Ceotina River, Western Kosovo, which is called Metohija including Djakovica, Pec and Istok and the
area around central-Skadar Lake.

Greater Montenegro 1945 onward
Montenegro proper or “Ancient Montenegro” (from Mt. Lovcen to Zeta River and from Pusti lisac to Sutorman including Cetinje, Rijeka Crnojevica, Virpazar and Kchevo), Rudine, Vasojevici, Shavnik, Podgorica region, the littoral from Skadar Lake to Bar, Ulcinj and the Bojana, Nikshic, Durmitor, Kolashin, Sinjajevina, the land around Piva River, Southern Sanjak with Pljevlja, Shahovici, Bijelo Polje, Mojkovac, Berane, Rozaje, Gusinje, Plav and Ceotina River, the area around mid-Skadar Lake, the Adriatic littoral from Bar to Grbalj and the Gulf of Boka Kotorska with the cities of Kotor, Risan, Hercegnovi and Perast.

Greater Greece 1881-1913
Greece proper (Morea, Livadia and Attica), Ionian Islands, western part of Aegean Islands (Cyclades and Sporades) and Thessaly with Larissa and Gulf of Volos.

Greater Greece 1913-1915
Greece proper (Morea, Livadia and Attica), Ionian Islands, western part of Aegean Islands (Cyclades and Sporades), Thessaly with Larissa and Gulf of Volos, Southern Epirus with Ioanina, Aegean Macedonia with Salonika, Chalkidiki Peninsula and Kavala, the Island of Crete, and the rest of Aegean Islands.

Greater Greece 1919-1922
Greece proper (Morea, Livadia and Attica), Ionian Islands, western part of Aegean Islands (Cyclades and Sporades), Thessaly with Larissa and Gulf of Volos, Southern Epirus with Ioanina, Aegean Macedonia with Salonika, Chalkidiki Peninsula and Kavala, the Island of Crete, the rest of Aegean Islands, Western Thrace with the littoral and Smyrna region in Asia Minor.

Greater Greece 1945 onward
Greece proper (Morea, Livadia and Attica), Ionian Islands, western part of Aegean Islands (Cyclades and Sporades), Thessaly with Larissa and Gulf of Volos, Southern Epirus with Ioanina, Aegean Macedonia with Salonika, Chalkidiki Peninsula and Kavala, the Island of Crete, the rest of Aegean Islands and the Islands of Dodecaneses.

Table 1: Realization of the greater (partly or almost united) national-states in the South-Eastern Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territories which should be included to united national state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great/United Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great/United Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great/United Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great/United Croatia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great/United Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great/United Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great/United Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great/United Montenegro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great/United Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great/United Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great/United Macedonia (Greek</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Realization of totally united (greater) national-states in the South-Eastern Europe in the future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (Macedonia)</td>
<td>Territory from Mt. Olympus to Mt. Shara and from Mt. Pindus to Mt. Rhodops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirin Macedonia (Bulgarian Macedonia)</td>
<td>Territory from Mt. Olympus to Mt. Shara and from Mt. Pindus to Mt. Rhodops.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ideology of Pan-Croatianism created by Pavao Ritter Vitezović, who developed the ancient theory upon derivation of all Slavs from the Illyrians, but unreasonably Croatized the later, was a historical construction and a political program as protest against long-time fragmentation of Croatian historical and ethnic territories, but it was at the same time and the politics against territorial pretensions on the Croatian historical-ethnic space by Republic of St. Marco. Finally, Vitezović attempted by his writings to obtain Habsburg political-military support for establishing the united Croatia, i.e. Croatia rediviva. Vitezović’s arguments were both historical and ethnolinguistic that helped him to appropriate a vast territory of Europe, from the Adriatic and Black Sea to Ural and the Baltic Sea, to Croatdom.

Vitezović even considered the whole territory of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a Croato-Slavic land primarily due to the fact that his knowledge about Poland and Lithuania primarily came from the writings of pro-Polish and pro-Slavic authors who saw Lithuania as Slavic territory, which was in the great extend Polonized, i.e. became of Slavic feature, through the Polish language and culture. In addition, Vitezović’s apprehension of Lithuania as Croato-Slavic land came from the facts that Slavic languages, among the others, were languages of official correspondence within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and what is more important, that a majority of Lithuania’s population at that time (70%) was of the Slavic origin. Subsequently, according to his Croatocentric doctrine, “Slavic” Grand Duchy of Lithuania was actually populated by ethnolinguistic Croats and belonged to united and Greater Croatia rediviva (Vitezović, 1700).

The Sremski Karlovci Metropolitan Stevan Stratimirović created an idea of autonomous tributary religion-language-based Orthodox Shtokavian Slavonic – Serbian state in 1804. The state should be governed by the Russian Grand Duke, to be under the Russian political-military protectorate, as well to be only nominally included into the Ottoman Empire and finally to pay annual fixed tribute to the Ottoman Sultan as its suzerain. Stratimirović’s concept of politically united religion-language-based Serbian nation within the borders of a single national state anticipated unification of the historical and ethnic Serbian territories from both the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. His notion of national identification of the Serbs was rather innovative at that time. In the other words, he created an idea of a national identity of the Serbs by combining the language criteria and the religious principle of identification. As a result, according to Stratimirović’s opinion, Serbian nation was represented by the entire Christian Orthodox South Slavic population who spoke Shtokavian dialect (Lehfeldt and Moguš, 1994). Subsequently, all Balkan territories settled by the Orthodox-Shtokavian South Slavs had to be included into the unified Serbia. Stratimirović’s idea was expressed in the Memorandum submitted to the Russian Emperor Alexander I Romanov. The Memorandum gave a great contribution to the history of Serbian premodern political doctrines and ideologies as one of the most important national state projects. This project was created during the turning point moment in the whole Serbian history. It was the time of the First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813) against the Turkish lordship. There were many plans during the uprising connected with the question of Serbian liberation and national political unification. The Memorandum was one of the most important of them. In addition, Stratimirović’s new idea on the national identity of the Serbs also has a great impact on later reformulations of the principles of the national identity and consequently on the remapping of the South-East Europe by creation of a united national state of the Serbs that was based primarily on the language.

The movement of Croatian national revival from the first half of the 19th century that is usually called as the „Illyrian Movement“ had a Pan-Croatian form of national identification and the creation of a national state of the Croats. According to the ideology of the „Illyrian Movement“, all South Slavs (the Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Slavs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro) belonged to the Croatian nation (a model created by Pavao Ritter Vitezović). Their national languages were considered only as the dialects of the Croatian language and consequently, their territories were accounted into the Croatian national soil and understood as the provinces of united Croat national state (Derkos, 1832). Based on such ideology, a Croatian historian Josip Parlaš printed in Zagreb in 1862 a Historical Map of Entire Old Kingdom of Croatia. According to the map, Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Srem, Montenegro, all Adriatic islands and Bosnia-Herzegovina belonged to the historic Kingdom of Croatia. The author of the map insinuated that all of these historical lands of Croatia should be integral part of new independent state of Croatia. He was followed by another Croatian historian, N. Z.
Bjelovučić, who printed in 1933 a map of Ethnicographic Borders of Croats in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Bjelovučić included within these borders whole Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Montenegrin littoral, Srem, whole Baranja, and Western Bachka (Sotirović, 2003). Finally, contemporary Croatian historiography follows similar way of thinking regarding territorial dispersion of Croatian nation and ethno-historical borders of united Croatia (Bilandžić, 1999). Probably, the most extreme case is the book History of Croatia by Dragutin Pavličević where it is written that the Serbs were not living in Bosnia before the Turks occupied this province in the mid-15th century, what is a pure lie. An Albanian nationhood was understood in the 19th century romanticist notion of the nationality, i.e., Albanians were the Balkan people whose mother tongue was Albanian regardless on confessional division of Albanian people into three denominations (Islamic, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox). Such "methodology" of national identification was implemented as well as by the Communist regime in Albania from 1967 to 1990 under the motto: "Our religion is Albanianism" (Turnock, 1989). Within the north Albania's tribes, especially among the Mirditi, the Roman Catholic Church was very influential. The Roman Catholic Church became the principal vigilante of the language, cultural heritage and national identity of the Albanians in Northern Albania (Draškić, 1986). The expression of common sense of Albanian nationhood was uttered by Albanian political leadership in the years of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913 in the following slogan: “Neve Shqiptar nuk jemi Greke, Slav, or Teerk, neve jemi Shqiptar” ("We Albanians are not Greeks, Slavs, or Turks, we are Albanians"). Albanian political "methodology" before and during the Balkan Wars was applied to prepare unification of all “ethnically Albanian territories” in the Balkans into a Great/Unified Albania - a single national state of all Albanians, i.e., within alleged Albanian historical and ethnic borders demanded by Albanian the First League of Prizren in the years of its existence 1878–1881. Essentially similar national-state concepts were also included in political programs of the Albanian Peja League, from 1899, the Greater Albanian Kosovo Committee, from 1920, and the Albanian Second Prizren League, from 1943. Shortly, preservation of the traditional, common law and local community as the organisational basis of the national movement followed by the demand for unification of all territories populated by the Albanians became Albanian primary national interest from 1878 onward: for instance, both Kosovo and Macedonian Albanians demanded in March-May 1981 during the mass anti-Yugoslav demonstrations a separation of Kosovo province and Western Macedonia from the SFR of Yugoslavia and their inclusion into a Greater Albania. The process of creation of Albanian nationality was not finished yet at the end of the 19th century. The Albanian nation was not considered as a political reality in Europe by many politicians. The Albanian people were among the last one in Europe to build up their own national identity and national community. When during the sessions of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the question of Albania and the Albanians was put on the agenda, the German Chancellor (Kanzler) Otto von Bismarck decisively rejected to speak about it with the explanation that there was no any kind of Albanian nationality in Europe (Logoreci, 1977). At the same period of time, the Serbs (either from Serbia or Montenegro) and the Greeks considered themselves as a nation (i.e., ethnic groups which had its own states) while the Albanians were understood only as the Balkan ethnic group (i.e., the group of people who did not have its own state). Consequently, ethnic group of Albanians could live only as an ethnic minority included into some of the Balkan national states and can not expect more than autonomous rights within them. At the turn of the 20th century many politicians in Serbia, Montenegro and Greece shared opinion that the ethnic group of Albanians was culturally and politically incapable of a modern national development and above all unable and incompetent to establish and administer their own national state. The backwardness of development of the Albanian society at the beginning of the 20th century was seen from the fact that initiated process of modernisation (Europeanisation) just started to change the Albanian tribal society, but failed to replace it with a modern European type of the industrial, parliamentary and civic society. The Albanian national movement was seen as an archaic social movement that can not reach a level of national cohesion in modern terms. This movement produced among the Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks a feeling of jeopardising the political and territorial integrity of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. For them, the theory of Illyrian-Albanian continuity is essentially a nationalistic ideological construction which became a driving political-ideological force for the Albanian politicians to create, from the Albanian point of view, the borders of united Albanian national state according to the Albanian ethnic rights. Geopolitically, this project demanded not only the territories which ethnically and historically belonged to the Albanians, but it went beyond them and encompassed the entire Illyrian-Albanian ethnic population, dispersed in different areas over the neighbouring Balkan regions: Kosovo-Metohija, Southern parts of Central Serbia, Çamëria (the Greek Epirus and Greek part of the Western Macedonia), western parts of the FYR of Macedonia and the Eastern Montenegro. Contrary to the theory of a backwardness of the Albanian social development, the Albanian political and intellectual leadership from the turn of the 20th century unconvincingly argued that the Albanians met all conditions required by contemporary political science to be recognised as a separate nation with a right to have its own national state: They had their separate ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity; The Albanian population settled on the Balkan territory is compact; The Albanians had a very precisely defined national program; They posses abilities to build up a community and their own
independent state which would be capable to administer their own people (Malig, 1993). The Albanian political and intellectual leadership often stressed that Albanians with their own national idea would never be successfully integrated either into the Serbian, Montenegrin or Greek societies and their national states. That is, in addition to the other numerous and diverse reasons, due to the facts: That the Albanians do not belong to the Slavic or Greek linguistic and cultural groups; That a divergence of national developments of the Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks, on the one hand, and the Albanians, on the other, was so deep; That their different national movements, political elites and national ideologies were incompatable (Ypi, 2007).

The Albanians, surely, were among the very few Balkan peoples who managed to find an internal balance between three confessions (Islam, Roman-Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity) and to build up the three-confession’s based national identity. The nationalists of Pan-Serbian orientation during the interwar period, 1919–1940, primarily members of the Serbian Radical Party, denied existence of separate Slovene and Croat nationalities understanding both of them as parts of Serbian national ethnolinguistic body (Djokić, 2012). In the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century Bulgarian nation did not exist in many eyes of ultra-Serbian, Croatian and Greek nationalists, while many Serb academicians considered the Albanian speaking population in Kosovo-Metohija and North Albania as the “lost Serbs” (i.e., Albanized Serbs) at the same time when many Greeks understood the Orthodox Albania’s population as Albanized Greeks.

A majority of Croats and Serbs understood all Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina as a part of their ethnolinguistic nationalities and never sincerely recognized either distinctive “Bosnian” nationality or “Bosniak” ethnicity. Both Serbs and Croats saw Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, Roman Catholics and Orthodox Christians as the population who spoke the same language as in practice they were and are speaking as a matter of fact. Consequently, all inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina have to be included into united Serbia, united Croatia respectively. The 19th century Serb philologist Vuk Stefanović Karadžić and Serb politician Ilija Garašanin are the founders of an idea that only ethnolinguistic Serbs were living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which should be included into a Great/Greater Serbia. At the same time, Karadžić and Garašanin created the notion of “linguistic” Serbian nationhood and statehood – an idea that can be realized only through significant changes of political borders in the Balkans became not exclusively the Orthodox one. If “they spoke Shtokavian, common to the Croats and the Serbs, which in Karadžić’s system belonged only to the Serbs, the Roman-Catholics and the Muslims had to be the Serbs (Banać, 1984). Garašanin “clearly accepted a new conception of Serbian linguistic nationhood, thereby rejecting positions of the Orthodox traditionalists, he was not accepting the Illyrianist idea of South Slavic reciprocity, which Zach also championed” (Banać, 1984).

Karađžić’s idea of “linguistic” Serbdom and Garašanin’s concept of a united Serbian national state had a great impact on development of Serbian political thought for the future generations of Serbian national workers. For instance, Serbian geographer and historian, Miloš St. Miljević, influenced by Karađžić’s and Garašanin’s teaching, printed a “Historical-Ethnographic-Geographic Map of the Serbs and Serbian (Yugoslav) lands in Turkey and Austria” in 1873 in Belgrade. According to the map, all South Slavs were seen as ethnolinguistic Serbs and all territories settled by them (38 historical provinces) should compose a united Serbia as a national state of all Serbs. Miljević was soon followed by Serbian professor of history, ethnology and geography, Vladimir Karić, who printed in 1887 another map of ethnogeographic dispersion of the Serbs at the Balkans. For him all South Slavs, except Bulgarians and Slovenes, were ethnolinguistic Serbs.

His suggestion was that the national-state borders of the Serbs should be identical with the ethno-geographic dispersion of the Serbian nation at the Balkans. Soon after the last Yugoslav civil war of 1991–1995 followed by the destruction of the FR of Yugoslavia, Serbian philologist from Belgrade and the university professor, Petar Molosavljević claimed in his book Serbs and their Language (Priština, 1997) that overwhelming majority of Yugoslavia’s Slavic population are originally ethnolinguistic Serbs. In other words, a reader can very easily conclude that external borders of Republic of Serbia (as potentially a national state of all Serbs) should be justifiably “moved” westwards in order to include Štokavian lands of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, main parts of Croatia and Dalmatia and whole Slavonia (Sotirović, 2003).

In the mid-19th century increased Slovenian cultural emancipation in the Habsburg Monarchy caused more demands for political autonomy for Slovenian lands in the monarchy. Slovenian intellectual elite drafted in revolutionary years of 1848–1849 for the first time in history a political program for creation of a “United Slovenia”. They called for unification of all Slovenian ethnic lands into a single political province within the Habsburg Monarchy with their own provincial parliament. Slovenian language will be an official language in such “United Slovenia” (Sotirović, 2005). Finally, the area of Macedonia was the crucial point of disputes among the Balkan states at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (1870–1913). The clash of the Balkan nationalism(s) over Macedonia and Macedonian Slavs was a result of: A struggle between European Great Powers over the territory of the Balkans; Development of the young Balkan Christian states; A national awakening of the Christian population within the borders of the Ottoman Empire.

A policy of the West European Great Powers in regard to the “Eastern Question” inclined in favor of protection of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, what means in favor of protection of the status quo at the Balkans (Michail,
2012). On the other hand, the Balkan states, supported by Russia, had to finish their own process of national liberation and possible unification, what means to dissolve the Ottoman Empire. However, their wish to finish the process of national liberation was challenged by their own antagonistic nationalism how to partition liberated territory from the Ottoman Empire. This problem had two main issues: historical and ethnic backgrounds of their territorial demands. Both of them became bases for their requirements over the territory of historic-geographic Macedonia. The crucial problem was to fix exact borders between the Balkan states after the military victory over the Ottoman Empire. All Balkan nations at that time accepted a German romantist principle of creation of the national state: “One language-one nation-one state”.

However, practical implementation of this principle at the Balkans, especially in some regions like Macedonia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, became tremendously difficult for the reason that different nations (ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious groups) lived mixed together as a consequence of migrations and historical development. The faith even today plays one of the crucial roles in ethnic or national identification among the Yugoslav and Balkan peoples and it will have a strong impact on their group’s identification in the future as well. Religious identity plays important role in defying the borders of ethnonational group because religious association is allied with the territorial aspect of the group identification. For that reason, the aspect of confession plays in many cases a pivotal role in fixing and demarcating the “national” living space, contributing at the same time to the image of the territory which has a particular (religious) character. However, the nationalism of the Balkan ethnic groups, being unable to fix clear ethnic and national-state borders, found in many historical cases as the best “solution” to “solve” the border problems: different types of “ethnic cleansing”, assimilation and exchange of the ethnic minorities.

The geopolitical background played also a significant role with regard to the “Macedonian Question”. Serbia as a continental state, being at the northern Balkans with the state borders on Danube River, was under strong political, economic and cultural influence from the Central Europe. Serbian foreign policy became completely changed after the Berlin Congress in 1878. Up to the Berlin Congress Serbian foreign policy was directed towards the west; in other words, towards Bosnia-Herzegovina with a final aim to annex this Ottoman province populated by Serb ethnolinguistic majority. However, after the Berlin Congress Serbian aspirations concerning territorial enlargement and national unification were forced to be redirected towards the south (as Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina) where the Ottoman Empire was in the process of internal dissolution and dismemberment. Serbia’s policy toward the “Macedonian Question” was characterized by three national and political-economic reasons:

The first one was expressed in her desire to annex part of Macedonian territory, which was considered to be populated by the ethnolinguistic (Shtokavian speaking) Serbs; The second one was based on her desire to escape from political and economic patronage by Austria-Hungary by obtaining the exit to the Aegean Sea as Serbia’s exit to the Adriatic Sea by having a common border with Montenegro was halted and obviated by Austria-Hungary after 1878; The basic argument of those Serbs who claimed that the Macedonian Slavs (or one part of them) are ethnic Serbs is based on the fact that Slavic population from Macedonia has one typical Serbian national custom: the slava – a family celebration of the patron day when the family ancestor was converted to Christianity. Similar territorial requirements and desires were present in political programmes of national unification by all other Balkan nations and states, as for instance in the case of Greece that was and is both Balkan and Mediterranean state. During the period of national revival the Greek policy concerning territorial enlargement was fluctuating between the north and the south: in the other words, between the Balkan mainland and the Mediterranean Islands.

Bulgarian penetration (from the west) into Macedonia, in comparison to Serbian political-economic penetration (from the north) and Greek (from the south), was, however, strongest. Bulgarian foreign policy was mainly directed towards Macedonia. For Bulgarian foreign policy makers the annexation of all Macedonia was the best instrument to prevent Serbia’s and Greece’s attempts to have a common state borders by division of Macedonia between themselves (Trifunovska, 1994). At the turn of a century the (old) “Macedonian Question” became a main apple of discord between the states of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. However, during the last decade of the 19th century an additional political factor emerged and took important place and a role in solving the “Macedonian Question”. It was Bulgaria’s sponsored Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – IMRO, which worked under the slogan; “Macedonia for the Macedonians”. Officially, the IMRO was fighting either for 1. an autonomous status of Macedonia within the borders of the Ottoman Empire, or for 2. the political-administrative unification of the entire territory of historical and geographic Macedonia as an independent state, but with a final political aim to become a part of Bulgaria like the Eastern Rumelia became in 1885. Nevertheless, the IMRO was under strong Bulgarian political influence and financial sponsorship and in the course of time received visible Bulgarian national character. The Serbian official political circles rejected to recognize Macedonian autonomous status within the Ottoman borders fearing that such kind of autonomous Macedonia will be finally included into the borders of Bulgaria. The idea of San Stefano Bulgaria from March 1878 became a crucial fear for the Greek and Serbian territorial aspirations at the Balkans. In both Belgrade and Athens, especially after 1908, it existed a strong consternation that Bulgaria would incorporate whole Macedonia as she did with the Eastern Rumelia in 1885. In fact, Belgrade and Athens wanted to divide Macedonian territory between themselves and Bulgaria (Aarbakke, 1992).
The most eminent proponent of the concept of a United Macedonia became the VMRO either before the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 or after Macedonia's independence in 1991. Today, this party-movement under the current name of the “VMRO-DPMNE” (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) is politically working under the official slogan of “Spiritual and Territorial Unification of Macedonia”. In the case of territorial unification of the entire geographical Macedonia into a single national state, the total population of such United Macedonia would be (according to the 1991 census) 4.5 million, as the population of Bulgarian part of Macedonia is 400,000, while the population of both the Greek Macedonia and the FYR of Macedonia are approximately the same, a little more than 2 million each.

In conclusion, for the Balkan nations territorial and national rights were always of much greater importance than human or civic rights. This historical fact became a milestone for development of national ideologies among the Yugoslavs, who put on a pedestal of “national policy” the aim to transform ethnographical borders into national-state borders. A period of the bloody destruction of the SFR of Yugoslavia followed by the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kosovo-Metochija and the FYR of Macedonia (1991–2001) is typical example of such national policy based on the idea of creation of a united national state, if possible without the ethnic minorities.

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